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2Are Progressive Fiscal Rules Stabilizing?
Nicolas L. Dromel, Patrick A. Pintus
Abstract
This paper studies how income-based, progressive taxes and transfers may reduce aggregate volatility by protecting
the economy against expectation-driven business cycles. Eliminating “local” sunspots that are arbitrarily close to
an indeterminate steady state requires, for sensible parameter values, strong levels of progressivity so as to make
labor supply close to inelastic. However, progressive taxes and transfers are shown to be ineﬀective to rule out stable
deterministic cycles (and the associated “global” sunspots) that are located close to a determinate steady state.
Our results are formalized within two benchmark models and show how the eﬃciency of progressive fiscal schemes
as local automatic stabilizers depends on the fiscal base. In the first setting with heterogeneous agents and segmented
asset markets in which wage income mostly finances consumption, we show that progressive taxes and transfers should
be made dependent on labor income, so as to rule out local indeterminacy. On the contrary, progressive fiscal rules
should be applied to capital income in an overlapping generations economy where consumption comes from savings
income. Incidentally, the latter results suggest that capital income taxes may be desirable, when progressive, to make
local expectation-driven fluctuations less likely. In both frameworks, key to the results is the property that progressive
fiscal rules provide insurance in the presence of imperfect capital markets.
Keywords: progressive taxes and transfers, business cycles, sunspots, endogenous cycles.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D33, D58, E32, E62, H24, H30.
1 Introduction
Income-dependent taxes and transfers have been proposed as eﬃcient automatic stabilizers since, at least,
Musgrave and Miller [27] (see also Vickrey [37, 38], Slitor [34], Friedman [15]). In recent years, the develop-
ment of dynamic general equilibrium models has proved useful to study in a precise manner how, in particular,
progressive fiscal schedules may stabilize the economy’s aggregate variables. This strand of literature specifi-
cally allows to evaluate the level of social insurance provided by given fiscal schemes in the presence of various
shocks. In particular, Guo and Lansing [19], Guo [17], Guo and Harrison [18], Dromel and Pintus [12] have
shown that progressive income taxes can rule out local indeterminacy and restore saddle-path convergence.
The present paper also studies how income-based, progressive taxes and transfers may reduce aggregate
volatility by protecting the economy against expectation-driven fluctuations (e.g. sunspot or cyclical equilib-
3ria). Our main conclusion is twofold. First, fiscal progressivity reduces, in parameter space, the likelihood of
sunspot equilibria that are arbitrarily close to an indeterminate steady state (as in Guo and Lansing [19]).
Most importantly, however, progressive schedules are shown to be ineﬀective to rule out stable (Hopf or flip)
deterministic cycles (and the associated “global” sunspots) that are located close to a determinate steady
state. Therefore, we establish that progressive fiscal schemes do not help immunizing the economy against
“global” expectation-driven business cycles. This is in contrast with the results reviewed above, which show
that the usual “bifurcation” leading to local indeterminacy (whereby the steady state goes from a saddle to
a sink, with eigenvalues going though infinity) can be prevented from occuring in the Ramsey model when
progressivity is allowed.
Also in contrast to the literature is our result that fully eliminating local indeterminacy and sunspots
requires, for sensible parameter values, strong progressivity. The main mechanism at the heart of this re-
sult is the following. When agents have optimistic expectations, they want to raise their consumption and,
accordingly, they devote a higher fraction of their time endowment to work so as to increase their income,
which originates an expansion. It follows that stabilizing labor supply movements requires low volatility of
disposable income, which in turn imposes high fiscal progressivity. From this basic argument, one expects the
eﬃciency of progressive taxes and transfers as automatic stabilizers to depend on the mechanisms leading to
expectation-driven volatility and, consequently, on the fiscal base. In other words, if consumption is mostly
financed by wage (resp. capital) income, then progressive taxes and transfers should apply to wage (resp.
capital) income. We formalize this argument within two benchmark models and show how the power of pro-
gressive taxes and transfers to rule out local indeterminacy depends on the fiscal base. In both frameworks,
key to the results is the property that progressive fiscal rules provide insurance in the presence of imperfect
capital markets. We first show that progressive taxes and transfers should be made dependent on labor income
in a heterogeneous agents economy with segmented asset markets in which wage income mostly finances con-
sumption. On the contrary, we demonstrate that progressive fiscal rules should be applied to capital income
in an overlapping generations (thereafter OLG) economy where consumption comes from savings income. In
4both models, progressive schemes are shown to reduce the range of parameter values that are compatible
with local indeterminacy, which does not preclude the steady state being surrounded by stable cycles and
global sunspots. In particular, the steady state turns out to be locally determinate if fiscal progressivity
is larger than some threshold value. For sensible parameter values, it turns out that the threshold level of
progressivity is, in the OLG model, half as high as the corresponding bound in the heterogeneous agents
model: it takes higher progressivity to stabilize the economy with financial constraints. As a consequence,
we argue that empirical evidence accords better with the (local) stabilizing eﬀects of progressive fiscal rules
in the OLG setting.
The two settings that we consider are admittedly limiting cases, as consumption is financed by labor in-
come in the first model and capital income in the second one. Obviously, we have in mind the more realistic
configuration that lies in between these two extremes but is closer to the former one. Our conclusions clearly
predict that fiscal progressivity should operate mainly through labor income when consumption relies pri-
marily on wage income, as seems to be the case in OECD countries. However, a slightly progressive tax and
transfer rate on capital income may still be desirable, as long as non-wage income partially finances consump-
tion expenditures, to make expectation-driven business cycles less likely. To our knowledge, this justification
for taxing capital income has not been noticed by the literature. Of course, the historical record shows
that stabilization concerns were not at the origin of income tax progressivity in advanced countries, about
a century ago. However, our analysis indicates that this does not imply that progressive fiscal schedules do
not have, de facto, some stabilizing properties. On the other hand, our study also suggests that progressive
taxes and transfers are ineﬃcient to rule out endogenous fluctuations when consumption is financed, even
partially, by the returns from financial assets that would remain untaxed (it is easily shown to be the case,
e.g. , in the monetary economy studied by Benhabib and Laroque [5]).
Few papers in the endogenous business-cycle literature study nonlinear tax schemes, all in the representa-
tive agent framework, following Guo and Lansing [19]. Only Guo [17] assumes, quite realistically, that capital
and labor taxes have diﬀerent statutory, progressivity features. We emphasize that several features diﬀerenti-
5ate our work from the latter papers. Most importantly, all models studied in this paper have constant returns
to scale (that is, externalities and imperfect competition are absent), which makes stabilization policies more
desirable a priori to improve welfare. Moreover, our results do not rely on either specifications for taxes,
preferences or technology, numerical values or simulations, and they do consider both taxes and transfers.
Also, our results stress the fact that identifying the relevant fiscal base is key when assessing the eﬃciency
of progressive fiscal rules as built-in stabilizers. Labor supply movements reacting to waves of optimism or
pessimism is here a key mechanism that may lead to sunspots and cycles, as in many papers in the literature.
However, what the present paper does is to underline the power of progressive taxes and transfers on factor
incomes to reduce labor and consumption volatility, which is hardly relevant in representative agent models
where total income is supposed to finance consumption.
The literature discussed above consider decentralized equilibria that summarize the behavior of a repre-
sentative agent, thereby ignoring the possible conflicting interests over the role of taxes. In contrast, Judd
[20, 21], Kemp et al. [23], Alesina and Rodrik [1], Sarte [32], Lansing [25], Be´nabou [3, 4], Saez [31] study the
redistributive and growth eﬀects of taxes. However, diﬀerently from these authors, we focus on the stabilizing
power of progressive fiscal schemes. Our analysis also touches upon the much debated question of capital
income taxation, as we show that capital taxes (however small) may be desirable to stabilize the economy.
To our knowledge, this argument has not been noticed in the literature which strongly suggests that capital
income taxes should be zero (see Chamley [10], Judd [20]). In contrast with most papers belonging to this
strand of the literature, our two settings allow for elastic labor. Moreover, money is present in the first model
(originally proposed by Woodford [39]) and it is held by a fraction of agents. These two features are certainly
plausible. On one hand, there is a large evidence showing that labor employment moves at all frequencies
in response to changes in real wages (moreover, theory also argues in favor of elastic labor; see, for instance,
Boldrin and Horvath [6]). On the other hand, 59% of U.S. households did not hold, in 1989, any interest
bearing assets (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin [26, Table 1, p. 962]). Therefore, incorporating elastic labor and
money, as a dominated asset, seems to provide relevant extensions of the current literature (see also Judd
6[20, 21] on elastic labor). Our second benchmark case is a well-known version of the OLG model. The first
setting studied in this paper is also indeed very close to a commonly used framework in the public finance
literature studying redistributive taxation (see, for instance, Judd [20, 21], Kemp et al. [23], Alesina and
Rodrik [1], Lansing [25]). Note that a recent paper by Seegmuller [33, s. 5.2.2] studies, in an example, the
eﬀects of nonlinear tax rates in the Woodford [39] model but restricts the analysis to regressive taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the heterogeneous agents economy with
segmented asset markets and discusses how eﬃcient progressive taxes and transfers are to make expectation-
driven fluctuations less likely. Section 3 introduces progressive fiscal rules in an OLG economy with capital
and elastic labor and shows how this feature may rule out local sunspots. Section 4 studies the quantitative
implications of our analysis. Finally, some concluding remarks and directions of future research are gathered
in Section 5, while three appendices present some proofs.
2 Stabilization Through Income-Based Taxes and Transfers in a Hetero-
geneous Agents Economy with Segmented Asset Markets
2.1 Fiscal Policy and Intertemporal Equilibria
A unique good is produced in the economy by combining labor lt ≥ 0 and the capital stock kt−1 ≥ 0
resulting from the previous period. Production exhibits constant returns to scale, so that output is given by:
F (k, l) ≡ Alf(a), (1)
where A ≥ 0 is a scaling parameter and the latter equality defines the standard production function in
intensive form defined upon the capital labor ratio a = k/l. On technology, we shall assume the following.
Assumption 2.1
7The intensive production function f(a) is continuous for a ≥ 0, Cr for a > 0 and r large enough, with
f I(a) > 0 and f II(a) < 0.
Competitive firms take real rental prices of capital and labor as given and determine their input demands
by equating the private marginal productivity of each input to its real price. Accordingly, the real competitive
equilibrium wage is:
ω = ω(a) ≡ A[f(a)− af I(a)], (2)
while the real competitive gross return on capital is:
R = ρ(a) + 1− δ ≡ Af I(a) + 1− δ, (3)
where 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0 is the constant depreciation rate for capital.
Fiscal policy is supposed to map market income x into disposable income φ(x). In this formulation, there
are two benchmark cases. When φ(x) is proportional to x, then φ has unitary elasticity and taxes and
transfers are linear. Decreasing the elasticity of φ(x) from one (when taxes and transfers are linear) to zero
may be interpreted as increasing fiscal progressivity. More precisely, one can postulate the following (see
Musgrave and Thin [28] for an early definition, and, for example, Lambert [24, chap. 7-8]).
Assumption 2.2
Disposable income φ(x) is a continuous, positive function of market income x ≥ 0, with φI(x) > 0 and
0 ≥ φII(x), for x > 0. The income tax-and-transfer scheme exhibits weak progressivity, that is, φ(x)/x is
non-increasing for x > 0 or, equivalently, 1 ≥ ψ(x) ≡ xφI(x)/φ(x).
Then π(x) ≡ 1−ψ(x) is a measure of residual income progressivity. In particular, the fiscal schedule is linear
when π(x) = 0, or ψ(x) = 1, for x > 0, and the higher π(x), the more progressive the fiscal schedule.
One can reinterpret the condition 1 ≥ ψ(x) as the property that the marginal tax-and-transfer rate
τm ≡ ∂(x − φ(x))/∂x is larger than the average tax-and-transfer rate τ ≡ (x − φ(x))/x: it is easily shown
8that τm − τ = φ(x)/x− φI(x) so that τm ≥ τ when 1 ≥ ψ(x) or π(x) ≥ 0 for all positive x. Moreover, fiscal
progressivity is naturally measured by π ≡ 1− ψ when one notes that π = (τm − τ)/(1− τ).
To complete the description of the model, we now characterize the behavior of both classes of agents. A
representative worker solves the following utility optimization problem, as derived in Appendix A:
maximize {V2(cwt+1/B)− V1(lt)} such that pt+1cwt+1 = ptφ(ωtlt), cwt+1 ≥ 0, lt ≥ 0, (4)
where B > 0 is a scaling factor, cwt+1 is next period consumption, lt is labor supply, pt+1 > 0 is next period
price of output (assumed to be perfectly foreseen), ωt > 0 is real wage, and φ(ωtlt) is disposable wage income,
as described in Assumption 2.2. To keep things simple, we assume in this section that progressive taxes and
transfers are depending on labor income only (capital taxes and subsidies are studied in the next section). We
consider the case such that leisure and consumption are gross substitutes and assume therefore the following:
Assumption 2.3
The utility functions V1(l) and V2(c) are continuous for l
∗ ≥ l ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0, where l∗ > 0 is the (maybe
infinite) workers’ endowment of labor. They are Cr for, respectively, 0 < l < l∗ and c > 0, and r large
enough, with V I1(l) > 0, V
II
1 (l) > 0, liml→l∗ V
I
1(l) = +∞, and V I2(c) > 0, V II2 (c) < 0, −cV II2 (c) < V I2(c) (that
is, consumption and leisure are gross substitutes).
The first-order condition of the above program (4) gives the optimal labor supply lt > 0 and the next
period consumption cwt+1 > 0, which can be stated as follows.
v1(lt) = ψ(ωtlt)v2(cwt+1) and pt+1c
w
t+1 = ptφ(ωtlt), (5)
where v1(l) ≡ lV I1(l) and v2(c) ≡ cV I2(c/B)/B. Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 implies that v1 and v2 are increasing
while v1 is onto R+. Therefore, Assumption 2.3 allows one to define, from Eqs. (5), γ ≡ v−12 ◦ [v1/ψ] (whose
graph is the oﬀer curve), which is a monotonous, increasing function only if the elasticity of ψ is either
negative or not too large when positive.
9Capitalists maximize the discounted sum of utilities derived from each period consumption. They consume
cct ≥ 0 and save kt ≥ 0 from their income, which comes exclusively from real gross returns on capital and
is not aﬀected by fiscal rules (see next section for the case of capital income-based taxes and transfers). To
fix ideas, we assume, following Woodford [39], that capitalists’ instantaneous utility function is logarithmic.
As easily shown (for instance by applying dynamic programming techniques), their optimal choices are then
given by a constant savings rate:
cct = (1− β)Rtkt−1, kt = βRtkt−1, (6)
where 0 < β < 1 is the capitalists’ discount factor and Rt > 0 is the real gross rate of return on capital.
As usual, equilibrium on capital and labor markets is ensured through Eqs. (2) and (3). Since workers
save their wage income in the form of money, the equilibrium money market condition is:
φ(ω(at)lt) =Mt/pt, (7)
where Mt ≥ 0 is money supply and pt is current nominal price of output. Finally, Walras’ law accounts for
the equilibrium in the good market. From the equilibrium conditions in Eqs. (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), one easily
deduces that the variables cwt+1, c
w
t , lt, pt+1, pt, c
c
t and kt are known once (at, kt−1) are given. This implies
that intertemporal equilibria may be summarized by the dynamic behavior of both a and k.
Definition 2.1
An intertemporal perfectly competitive equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence (at, kt−1) of R2++,
t = 1, 2, . . ., such that
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
v2(φ(ω(at+1)kt/at+1)) = v1(kt−1/at)/ψ(ω(at)kt−1/at),
kt = βR(at)kt−1.
(8)
Note that the distribution of assets does not degenerate in this framework, as diﬀerent agents hold money
and capital (in contrast with Becker [2]).
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In view of Eqs. (8) and recalling that a = k/l, the nonautarkic steady states are the solutions (a, l) in
R2++ of v2(φ(ω(a)l)) = v1(l)/ψ(ω(a)l) and βR(a) = 1. Equivalently, in view of Eq. (3), the steady states are
given by: ⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
v2(φ(ω(a)l)) = v1(l)/ψ(ω(a)l),
ρ(a) + 1− δ = 1/β.
(9)
We shall solve the existence issue by choosing appropriately the scaling parameters A and B, so as to
ensure that one stationary solution coincides with, for instance, (a, l) = (1, 1). For sake of brevity, the proof
is given in Appendix B.
2.2 Ruling Out Local Indeterminacy Through Labor Income-Based Fiscal Progressivity
We now study the dynamics of Eqs. (8) around one of its interior stationary points (a, k). These equations
define locally a dynamical system of the form (at+1, kt) = G(at, kt−1) if the derivative of ω(a)/a with respect
to a does not vanish at the steady state, or equivalently if εω(a) − 1 W= 0, where the notation εω stands for
the elasticity of ω(a) evaluated at the steady state under study. Then, the usual procedure to study the local
stability of the steady states is to use the linear map associated to the Jacobian matrix of G, evaluated at
the fixed point under study.
We assume that, in the neighborhood of the steady state that has been conveniently normalized by the
procedure in Proposition B.1, φ has a constant elasticity ψ = 1 − π with 1 > π ≥ 0. Our reason for
restricting the analysis to this benchmark is twofold. Most importantly, economic theory does not place
strong restrictions on how the elasticity ψ(x) of after-tax income varies with pre-tax income x (see e.g.
Lambert [24]). Therefore, we choose to be parcimonious and introduce fiscal progressivity through a single
parameter, that is, π = 1−ψ that is locally constant. As it will soon appear, the following analysis could be
easily adapted to account for a (locally) non-constant elasticity. A related but stronger assumption (that is,
constant residual income progression) has been used in papers by Feldstein [14], Kanbur [22], Persson [29] in
static models, and by Guo and Lansing [19], Be´nabou [3, 4] in growth models.
11
Straightforward computations yield the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Linearized Dynamics around a Steady State)
Under the assumptions of Proposition B.1, suppose that φ has constant elasticity in the neighborhood of
the steady state (a, k) of the dynamical system in Eqs. (8), i.e. ψ(x) = 1 − π, with 0 < π < 1 measuring
fiscal progressivity based on labor income. Let εR, εω, εγ be the elasticities of the functions R(a), ω(a), γ(l),
respectively, evaluated at the steady state (a, k) and assume that εω W= 1. The linearized dynamics for the
deviations da = a− a, dk = k − k are determined by the linear map:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
dat+1 = − εγ/(1−π)+εRεω−1 dat +
a
k
εγ/(1−π)−1
εω−1 dkt−1,
dkt =
k
aεRdat + dkt−1.
(10)
The associated Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state under study has trace T and determinant D,
where
T = T1 −
εγ − 1
(1− π)(εω − 1)
, with T1 = 1 +
|εR|− 1/(1− π)
εω − 1
,
D = εγD1, with D1 =
|εR|− 1
(1− π)(εω − 1)
.
Moreover, one has T1 = 1 +D1 + Λ, where Λ ≡ −π|εR|/[(1− π)(εω − 1)].
We shall assume throughout that a steady state exists in the whole range of parameter values that will be
considered. To fix ideas, we may assume without loss of generality that the steady state has been normalized
at (a, k) = (1, 1) (see Proposition B.1).
Now fix the technology (i.e. εR and εω), at the steady state, and vary the parameter representing workers’
preferences εγ > 1. In other words, consider the parametrized curve (T (εγ),D(εγ)) when εγ describes
(1,+∞). Direct inspection of the expressions of T and D in Proposition 2.1 shows that this locus is a half-
line ∆ that starts close to (T1, D1) when εγ is close to 1, and whose slope is 1− |εR|, as shown in Fig. 1. The
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value of Λ = T1 − 1−D1, on the other hand, represents the deviation of the generic point (T1,D1) from the
line (AC) of equation D = T − 1, in the (T,D) plane.
Insert Figures 1-2 here.
The main task we now face is locating the half-line ∆ in the plane (T,D), i.e. its origin (T1, D1) and its
slope 1 − |εR|, as a function of the parameters of the system. The parameters we shall focus on are the
depreciation rate for the capital stock 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0, the capitalist’s discount factor 0 < β < 1, the share of
capital in total income 0 < s = aρ(a)/f(a) < 1, the elasticity of input substitution σ = σ(a) > 0, and fiscal
progressivity 1 > π ≥ 0, all evaluated at the steady state (a, k) under study. In fact, it is not diﬃcult to get
the following expressions.
D1 = (θ(1− s)− σ)/[(1− π)(s− σ)], Λ = −πθ(1− s)/[(1− π)(s− σ)],
T1 = 1 +D1 + Λ, slope∆ = 1− θ(1− s)/σ,
(11)
where θ ≡ 1− β(1− δ) > 0 and all these expressions are evaluated at the steady state under study.
Our aim now is to locate the half-line ∆, i.e. its origin (T1, D1) and its slope in the (T,D) plane when the
capitalists’ discount rate β, as well as the technological parameters δ, s, and the level of fiscal progressivity
π at the steady state are fixed, whereas the elasticity of factor substitution σ is made to vary. One easily
show that the benchmark economy with constant fiscal rate π = 0 (or ψ = 1) is equivalent to the no-tax-and-
transfer case studied by Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder [16]: the origin (T1,D1) of ∆ is located on the
line (AC), i.e. Λ ≡ 0 (see Fig. 1). The immediate implication of the resulting geometrical representation is
that indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations emerge only for low values of σ (σ < σI , and indeed for σ
less than s, the share of capital in output) while, on the contrary, local determinacy is bound to prevail for
larger values of σ. One corollary of this is that linear tax-and-transfer rates on wage income do not aﬀect the
range of parameter values that are associated with local indeterminacy and bifurcations.
To anticipate our main result about fiscal progressivity (when π > 0), it is enough to notice from eqs. (10)
13
that εγ/(1 − π) enters the expressions of the trace and determinant. This implies that the half-line ∆ can
be alternatively generated by varying π, for fixed εγ. For example, fixing εγ = 1 and increasing π from zero
to one would result in the exact configuration of Fig. 1. The most important implication of this fact is that
there exists a critical value for π such that ∆ does not intersect the indeterminacy region (that is, the ABC
triangle). The next proposition shows that such a threshold exists for all σ’s. The full charaterization of all
possible cases that occur when one increases π are stated in Proposition C.1 (see Appendix C). The most
important implication of Proposition C.1 is that there exists a threshold level of fiscal progressivity on labor
income πmin above which the steady state is locally determinate, thereby excluding “local” sunspots.
Proposition 2.2 (Ruling Out Local Indeterminacy Through Progressive Fiscal Rules)
Under the assumptions stated in Proposition C.1, there exists a threshold level of fiscal progressivity on labor
income πmin ≡ 2[θ(1− s)− s+
0
s(s− θ(1− s))]/[θ(1− s)] such that the steady state is locally determinate
(that is, a saddle or a source) when π > πmin (see Fig. 2).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 2.2 contains an important implication: it is easily shown (by L’Hoˆpital’s rule) from the ex-
pression of πmin that it converges, from below, to one when θ tends to zero. In practice, θ = 1 − β(1 − δ)
is bound to be close to zero when the period is commensurate with business-cycle length, as β ≈ 1 and
δ ≈ 0. Therefore, for sensible parameter values, fully eliminating local sunspots may require close-to-maximal
progressivity. We examine quantitative aspects in Section 4.
We should emphasize that Proposition 2.2 does not rule out the case of a steady state being a source
(locally) surrounded by a stable Hopf curve, in which case “global” sunspots and complex dynamics are
possible (see Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder [16]). It is also possible that the steady state be a saddle
surrounded by a stable period-two saddle created through a flip bifurcation. Here again, global sunspots
could be constructed provided that the support contains the periodic orbit. Therefore, progressive schedules
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are ineﬀective to rule out stable deterministic cycles, and the associated global sunspot equilibria, that are
located close to a determinate steady state. In other words, although progressive fiscal schemes may rule
out local indeterminacy, they do not help immunizing the economy against global expectation-driven business
cycles. In contrast, most results in the existing literature show that the usual “bifurcation” leading to local
indeterminacy (whereby the steady state goes from a saddle to a sink, with eigenvalues going though infinity)
can be prevented from occuring in the Ramsey model when progressivity is allowed.
2.3 Interpreting the Results
Our last step is to provide some intuitive explanation of the mechanisms at work that create some stabilizing
power of progressive fiscal schedules. Roughly speaking, the main eﬀect of progressivity tax rates can be
interpreted as “taxing away the higher returns from belief-diven labor or investment spurts” (Guo and Lansing
[19, p. 482]). However, note that in all models we are focusing on in this paper, returns to scale are constant
both at the social level and at the firm level. In particular, the slope of labor demand (as a function of real
wage) is negative so that fiscal progressivity does not reduce the likelihood of indeterminacy by changing
the sign of labor demand’s slope (in contrast with Guo and Lansing [19]). Moreover, we consider both taxes
and transfers. Therefore, what remains to be elucidated is the sequence of events that make self-fulfilling
expectations the driving force of the business cycle when taxes and transfers are progressive, even though
externalities (or imperfect competition) are absent. More importantly, one would like to understand why
large fiscal progressivity on factor income is required to stabilize the economy. As we now illustrate, key to
the results is the fact that the more progressive taxes and transfers based on labor income, the more stable
disposable wage income and, therefore, the less elastic workers’ labor supply.
It is helpful to start with the benchmark case of a linear fiscal rate (which also covers the case with zero
taxes and transfers) on labor income. In that case, workers’ decisions are summarized by Eqs. (5) that may
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be written as follows, as φ reduces to the identity function and ψ = 1:
v1(lt) = v2(ptωtlt/pt+1). (12)
The latter first-order condition shows that when workers expect, in period t, that the price of goods pt+1
will go, say, down tomorrow, they wish to increase their consumption at t+ 1 and, therefore, to work more
today (remember that gross substitutability is assumed) so as to save more in the form of money balances
to be consumed tomorrow. Moreover, the dynamical system in Eqs. (8) may be written as follows:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
v2(ωt+1lt+1) = v1(lt),
kt = βR(kt−1/lt)kt−1.
(13)
A higher labor supply lt will lead to greater output, larger consumption and a smaller capital-labor ratio
kt−1/lt and, therefore, to a higher return on capital Rt, so that, from Eqs. (13), capital demand kt and
investment will increase. Moreover, a larger capital stock kt tomorrow will tend to increase tomorrow’s real
wage ωt+1 which will trigger an increase in tomorrow’s labor supply. However, a higher capital stock will
also tend to increase the ratio of capital/labor and, eventually, the eﬀect on capitalists’ savings will turn
negative: a higher capital-labor ratio leads to a lower rate of return on capital and, therefore, to lower capital
demand and investment. This will lead to lower wage, lower labor supply, etc: the economy will experience
a downturn. Note that this intuitive description relies on the presumption that both wage and interest rate
are elastic enough to the capital-labor ratio: the elasticity of input substitution σ must be small enough.
Now, we would like to shed some light on why progressive fiscal rates makes the occurrence of self-fulfilling
fluctuations less likely. Assume again, for simplicity, that φ has constant elasticity around the steady state.
In that case, Eqs. (5) reduce to:
γ(lt) = ptφ(ωtlt)/pt+1, (14)
where γ ≡ v−12 ◦ [v1/ψ]. When π increases from zero to one, the volatility of wage income decreases to
zero: eventually, a highly progressive fiscal rate on labor income (that is, π close to one) leads to an almost
constant wage bill, which in turn leads to a more stable consumption and, thereby, a smaller reaction of labor
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supply to optimistic expectations, in comparison to the case of linear taxes and transfers. More specifically,
Eq. (14) shows that a large progressivity π decreases the elasticity of labour supply to expected inflation and
real wage. To see this, diﬀerentiate Eqs. (14) to get:
(εγ − 1 + π)
dl
l
= −dπ
e
πe
+ (1− π)dω
ω
, (15)
where πe denotes expected inflation, that is, πet+1 ≡ pt+1/pt. Eq. (15) clearly shows how the higher fiscal
progressivity π, the less elastic labor supply to both expected inflation and real wage, thereby limiting
both the initial impact of expectations movements and their subsequent eﬀect on labor supply. Therefore,
optimistic expectations (say, a reduction in pt+1) lead to a smaller increase of consumption and labor when
fiscal policy is highly progressive so that local indeterminacy is ruled out. We now show how the results diﬀer
when fiscal rules are based on capital income.
2.4 Capital Income-Based Fiscal Progressivity
Our description of the mechanisms that account for the stabilizing power of progressive fiscal rules based on
labor income also suggest that taxing/subsidizing capital income in a progressive manner is not expected to
rule out local indeterminacy and bifurcations: in a nutshell, taxing (resp. subsidizing) capital income merely
amounts to reducing (resp. increasing) capitalists’ disposable revenues, thereby aﬀecting their consumption
(which is negligible when the discount factor is close enough to one) and investment demands, as seen from
Eqs. (6). This does not alter workers’ consumption and labor supply movements. In other words, only
the second equation of the dynamical system (8) is aﬀected. However, our analysis and interpretation in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 have shown that variations in workers’ consumption and labor supply are at the origin
of expectation-driven fluctuations so that taxing or subsidizing capitalists’ income (even progressively) is not
expected to rule out such business cycles. This is what we now formalize. If we apply our non-linear fiscal
schedule (under Assumption 2.2) to capital income, it is not diﬃcult to derive the dynamical system that
now summarizes intertemporal equilibria (the proof is available from the authors upon request):
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Definition 2.2
An intertemporal perfectly competitive equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence (at, kt−1) of R2++,
t = 1, 2, . . ., such that
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
v2(ω(at+1)kt/at+1) = v1(kt−1/at),
kt = βψ(R(at)kt−1)φ(R(at)kt−1).
(16)
For sake of brevity, we assume that a normalized steady state exists and, moreover, that φ has constant
elasticity ψ = 1− π. One then easily derives:
T = T1 −
εγ − 1
εω − 1
, with T1 = 1− π +
(1− π)|εR|− 1
εω − 1
, (17)
D = εγD1, with D1 = (1− π)
|εR|− 1
εω − 1
. (18)
Insert Figure 3 here.
The impact of fiscal progressivity is summarized in Fig. 3. Starting from Fig. 1 (when π = 0), one can see
from Fig. 3 that increasing π reduces, here again, the slope of ∆1 (the locus such that εγ = 1). However, the
intersection of ∆1 with the line (AC) (when σ = +∞) now moves south-west along (AC) when π increases.
The main implication is that the qualitative picture is not much aﬀected by the presence of capital income
taxes: more precisely, local indeterminacy still prevails as long as labor supply is not too inelastic (that is, if
εγ is not too large) and inputs are not too substitutable (that is, σ < σI), see Fig. 3. The expression of σI
(such that 1 + T1(σ) +D1(σ) = 0) turns out to be as follows.
Proposition 2.3 (Local Indeterminacy in Spite of Progressive Fiscal Rules)
Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, progressive taxes and transfers on capital income do not rule out local
indeterminacy and bifurcations of the steady state of Eqs. (16).
More precisely, the steady state is a sink (locally indeterminate) if labor supply is suﬃciently elastic (εγ
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not too large) and if the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is small enough, that is, σ < σI = s/2 +
θ(1 − s)(1 − π)/(2 − π), where s is the share of capital income (see Fig. 3). In particular, σI = s/2 when
progressivity is maximal (that is, when π = 1).
Again, as argued at the end of Subsection 2.2, θ is close to zero when the period is short (say, a year
or less) so that a progressive fiscal rules based on capital income reduces the scope of local indeterminacy,
but only to a negligible extent. We now show that diﬀerent conclusions are obtained in an OLG economy in
which progressive capital income taxes and transfers may stabilize labor supply and, thereby, immunize the
economy against local indeterminacy.
3 Stabilization Through Income-Based Taxes and Transfers in an OLG
Economy
3.1 Progressive Capital Income-Based Fiscal Rules
In the competitive, non-monetary economy studied in this section (see Reichlin [30]), a unique good is
produced, which can be either consumed or saved as investment by a constant population of households
living two periods. Agents are identical within each generation, supply labor and save their wage income in
the form of capital when young, to be consumed when old. Using the same notation as in Section 2, agents
born at time t solve the following program:
maximize {V2(ct+1/B)− V1(lt)} such that kt = ωtlt, ct+1 = φ(Rt+1kt), ct+1 ≥ 0, lt ≥ 0. (19)
We start by imposing that taxes and transfers depend on savings income only (see next section for the
case of fiscal rules based on labor income). Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, it is easily shown that the
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first-order conditions of the above problem are:
v1(lt) = ψ(Rt+1ωtlt)v2(ct+1) and ct+1 = φ(Rt+1ωtlt). (20)
Therefore, intertemporal equilibria may here again be summarized by the dynamic behavior of both a and
k, as follows.
Definition 3.1
An intertemporal perfectly competitive equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence (at, kt−1) of R2++,
t = 1, 2, . . ., such that ⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
v2(φ(R(at+1)kt)) = v1(kt−1/at)/ψ(R(at)kt−1),
kt = ω(at)kt−1/at.
(21)
By comparing Eqs. (8) and (21), one uncovers the correspondence existing between the model with seg-
mented asset markets and the present OLG model: the dynamical system (21) summarizing equilibria in
the OLG economy can be obtained from (8) by changing the distribution of factor incomes. While young
agents save their wage income and old agents consume their capital income, in the OLG setting, the reverse
is true in the model of Section 2: workers consume their (real) wage income whereas capitalists save their
capital income (entirely if they are extremely patient, that is, β = 1). This correspondence will obviously
help to interpret the results and, in particular, to explain why capital income taxes and transfers may be
desirable to stabilize the economy. But it does also lead one to derive easily the jacobian matrix of (21) and,
therefore, the analog of Proposition 2.1: what is needed is simply to replace εω − 1 by εR and vice-versa. By
adapting the procedure in Proposition B.1, one establishes the existence of a normalized steady state1 and
the following statements hold.
Proposition 3.1 (Linearized Dynamics around a Steady State)
1For sake of brevity, the proof is omitted.
20
Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, suppose that φ has constant elasticity in the neighborhood of a steady
state (a, k) of the dynamical system in Eqs. (21) that is assumed to exist, i.e. ψ(x) = 1− π, with 0 < π < 1
measuring fiscal progressivity based on capital income. Let εR, εω, εγ be the elasticities of the functions
R(a), ω(a), γ(l), respectively, evaluated at the steady state (a, k). The linearized dynamics for the deviations
da = a− a, dk = k − k are determined by the linear map:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
dat+1 = − εγ/(1−π)+εω−1εR dat +
a
k
εγ/(1−π)−1
εR dkt−1,
dkt =
k
a(εω − 1)dat + dkt−1.
(22)
The associated Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state under study has trace T and determinant D,
where
T = T1 +
εγ − 1
(1− π)|εR| , with T1 = 1 +
εω − 1 + 1/(1− π)
|εR| ,
D = εγD1, with D1 =
εω
(1− π)|εR| .
Moreover, one has T1 = 1 +D1 + Λ, where Λ ≡ π(1− εω)/[(1− π)|εR|].
Proposition 3.1 reveals that the geometrical configuration is here qualitatively similar to the one that we
have derived in Section 2. In particular, fixing technology and varying the elasticity of the oﬀer curve εγ
generates, in the (T,D) plane, a half-line ∆ that starts close to (T1, D1) when εγ is close to one and whose
slope is εω = s/σ.
Insert Figures 4-5 here.
It is then straightforward to derive the following expressions which critically depend on the elasticity of input
substitution σ ≥ 0 and fiscal progressivity 0 < π < 1.
D1 = [1− δ(1− s)]/[(1− π)(1− s)], Λ = π(σ − s)[1− δ(1− s)]/[(1− s)(1− π)],
T1 = 1 +D1 + Λ, slope∆ = s/σ.
(23)
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In the benchmark case with linear (or no) taxes and transfers (that is, π = 0 or ψ = 1), the situation
is as in Fig. 4: the steady state is a sink and looses stability through Hopf bifurcations only when σ < s.
The immediate implication is that endogenous cycles and sunspot equilibria occur only for low values of σ,
that is, only if capital and labor are complementary enough. On the contrary, local determinacy prevails
when σ > s. Just as in our first model of Section 2, it turns out that linear tax-and-transfer rates on capital
income do not modify the range of parameter values compatible with local indeterminacy and bifurcations.
However, inspection of Eqs. (23) shows that increasing π from zero to one increases D1 from a positive value
[1 − δ(1 − s)]/(1 − s) (which is plausibly assumed to be less than one when δ is close to one; see Fig. 4)
to infinity. In other words, there exists a value πmin, illustrated by Fig. 5, above which the steady state is
locally determinate (either a saddle or a source). This value is simply defined by the condition that D1 = 1,
or equivalently, πmin ≡ (δ(1− s)− s)/(1− s).
Proposition 3.2 (Local Stability and Bifurcations of the Steady State)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1, the following generically holds when δ(1−s) > s and π < πmin ≡
(δ(1− s)− s)/(1− s) (that is, fiscal progressivity is not too large).
1. 0 < σ < s: the steady state is a sink for 1 < εγ < εγH , where εγH ≡ (1− π)(1− s)/[1− δ(1− s)] is the
value of εγ for which ∆ crosses [BC]. Then the steady state undergoes a Hopf bifurcation (the complex
characteristic roots cross the unit circle) at εγ = εγH , and is a source when εγ > εγH .
2. s < σ: the steady state is a saddle when εγ > 1.
3.2 Progressive Capital Income Taxes and Transfers as Automatic Stabilizers
The most important implication of Proposition 3.2 is that the half-line ∆ intersects the indeterminacy
triangle ABC only if π is small enough: in other words, there exists a threshold level of fiscal progressivity
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πmin above which the steady state is locally determinate, thereby here again excluding local sunspots but,
however, not stable cycles and global sunspots.
Proposition 3.3 (Ruling Out Local Indeterminacy Through Progressive Fiscal Rules)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.2, there exists a threshold level of fiscal progressivity on capital
income πmin ≡ (δ(1− s)− s)/(1− s) such that the steady state is locally determinate (that is, a saddle or a
source) when π > πmin (see Fig. 5).
Our last step aims at providing an intuitive description of the mechanisms that account for the stabilizing
power of progressive taxes and transfers on capital income. It is relevant to recall the correspondence
noticed above between the two models considered in this paper. Roughly speaking, one goes from one model
to the other by inversing the distribution of factor incomes. This implies that if fiscal schemes that are
progressive and based on labor income rules out local indeterminacy and bifurcations in the heterogeneous
agents economy, as we have shown, one expects that fiscal schemes related to capital income should have the
same eﬀects in the OLG setting. We now go a little further to be more specific about the basic mechanisms at
work. As in the previous model (in Section 2), tomorrow’s consumption and today’s labor supply movements
following a wave of optimism are necessary to sustain expectation-driven equilibria. Specifically, the first-
order conditions in Eqs. (20) can be rewritten as:
γ(lt) = φ(Rt+1ωtlt), (24)
where γ ≡ v−12 ◦ [v1/ψ] and φ has, for simplicity, constant elasticity around the steady state. Therefore,
direct inspection of Eq. (24) reveals that the more progressive the fiscal rate on capital income, the more
stable consumption and labor supply. More precisely, if young agents expect, in period t, the return on
capital Rt+1 to go, say, up, they wish to increase tomorrow’s consumption and, therefore, to work more
today. However, a larger capital stock following the investment boom will eventually depress the return on
capital and lower capital demand, turning the economy into a recession because of pessimistic expectations.
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When π increases from zero to one, the volatility of capital income decreases to zero: eventually, a highly
progressive fiscal rate (that is, π close to one) leads to almost constant capital income and tomorrow’s
consumption, which in turn leads to a much smaller reaction of labor supply to optimistic expectations, in
comparison to the case of linear taxes. More specifically, with π close to one, φ is almost constant and,
in that case, Eq. (24) show that a large progressivity π decreases the elasticity of labour supply to expected
return on capital and real wage. To see this, diﬀerentiate Eqs. (24) to get:
(εγ − 1 + π)
dl
l
= (1− π)[dR
R
+
dω
ω
]. (25)
Eq. (25) clearly shows how the higher capital income fiscal progressivity π, the less elastic labor supply to both
expected capital return and real wage, thereby limiting both the initial impact of expectations movements
and their subsequent eﬀect on labor supply. Therefore, optimistic expectations (say, an increase in Rt+1)
lead to a smaller increase of consumption and labor when the capital fiscal rate is highly progressive so that
local indeterminacy are ruled out.
In view of the above discussion, similar results are expected to hold in an extended version of the OLG
model in which young agents may consume a fraction of their wage income. More precisely, it is known that
the higher the propensity to consume out of wage income, the less likely local indeterminacy and bifurcations
(see Cazzavillan and Pintus [9]). Therefore, one expects that taxing (in a progressive way) capital income in
such setting would still stabilize old agents’ consumption and make local indeterminacy less likely. However,
allowing for consumption in the first period of life would make the analysis heavier.
Moreover, our intuitive discussion also gives a hint on why progressive taxes and transfers on labor income
do not rule out local indeterminacy: this is simply not helpful to stabilize tomorrow’s consumption and
today’s labor supply. In fact, it turns out that this enlarges the range of parameters values compatible with
sunspots and cycles, as shown in Fig. 6.
Insert Figure 6 here.
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In that case, one can show (computations are available from the authors upon request) that the steady
state is a sink (locally indeterminate) when εγ is not too large and σ < σI ≡ s(1−s)/[1−δ(1−s)] (see Fig. 12,
which covers the case π > πmin). For instance, σI = 1−s > s when, plausibly, δ = 1 and s < 1/2. Therefore,
in comparison with the case with linear or progressive taxes and transfers on capital income, opposite results
are obtained, as the range of σ’s for which local indeterminacy and bifurcations occur is enlarged by the
introduction of progressive fiscal rules based on labor income. In view of our intuitive discussion above, this
is straightforward to explain. In that case, the first-order conditions of young agents’ problem are:
γ(lt) = Rt+1φ(ωtlt), (26)
as only wage income is aﬀected by fiscal policy. Eq. (26) clearly shows that wage income is almost stable when
the fiscal rate on labor income is highly progressive. However, this is not enough to stabilize labor supply and
tomorrow’s consumption that depend also on movements of the interest rate. Therefore, consumption and
labor supply will still be subject to endogenous volatility, however progressive taxes and transfers on labor
income are. Now, to explain that progressive fiscal schemes based on labor income make local indeterminacy
more likely requires recalling that, in this model, cyclical paths (be they deterministic or stochastic) arise
because of two conflicting eﬀects on savings that operate through wage and interest rate (see Cazzavillan and
Pintus [9]). More precisely, when the capital stock increases (say, from its steady state value), this triggers an
increase in wage and savings that will be, eventually, reversed by a lower interest rate that, on the contrary,
depresses savings. For a given deviation of the capital stock, the (disposable) wage eﬀect will be smaller
when progressive taxes and transfers on labor income are introduced so that the eﬀect of the interest rate
will be more likely to reverse it.
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4 Assessing the Stabilization Eﬀect of Progressive Fiscal Rules
In this section, we derive some quantitative implications about the (local) stabilization eﬀect of progressive
taxes and transfers, when some parameter values are considered. Let us start with the model of Section 2.
Consider the standard values β = 0.96, δ = 0.1 (based on annual data) and s = 1/3. Then, from Proposition
2.2, one has that πmin ≈ 0.92 (moreover, 1 − θ(1 − s)/s ≈ 0.73 and [s − θ(1 − s)]/[s − θ(1 − s)/2] ≈ 0.84).
If one focuses on taxes, this seems a high value, e.g. with respect to actual US data on average marginal
tax rates. For example, our computations from Stephenson [35, Table 1, p. 391] deliver that income tax
progressivity has ranged in 4% − 11% over the last sixty years (in accord with some recent evaluations by
Cassou and Lansing [7], for example). With alternative measures in mind, Caucutt, Imrohoroglu and Kumar
[8, p. 550] argue in favor of values approaching 50%, while Be´nabou [4, pp. 501-2] concludes that 20% is a
reasonable estimate for tax progressivity.
On the other hand, transfers are typically found to be more progressive than taxes. For instance, Englund
and Persson [13] report a value of π = 63% for Sweden (see also Davidson and Duclos [11] who present related
results for Canada). In our analysis, it is total progressivity (of both taxes and transfers) that is relevant. In
view of the reported evidence, one may conclude that the level of progressivity that is required to rule out
local indeterminacy in the heterogenous-agent model of Section 2 seems too high. More precisely, case 1 in
Proposition C.1 (see Fig. C1) is most likely to occur. However, one is led to a diﬀerent assessment of the
plausibility of progressive fiscal rules as automatic stabilizers in the OLG model of Section 3. By adopting
the standard values s = 1/3 and δ = 0.96 (which corresponds to an annual depreciation rate of 0.1 if the
period length is 30 years), Proposition 3.3 yields πmin ≈ 0.46. The critical level of fiscal progressivity is, in
the OLG setting, half as high as the threshold value obtained in the heterogenous-agent model. Moreover, it
falls within the range of estimates that include taxes and transfers we just discussed.2
2Our numerical examples are reminiscent of early discussions about the practical importance of “built-in flexibility”, e.g. in
Musgrave and Miller [27], Vickrey [37, 38], Slitor [34].
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5 Conclusion
In agreement with the recent literature, we have shown that income-based taxes and transfers may immu-
nize the economy against local sunspots, provided though that the level of progressivity is high enough and
if progressive fiscal rules are applied to the relevant fiscal base so as to stabilize labor supply movements.
More surprisingly, however, we have established that progressive fiscal schemes do not help immunizing the
economy against “global” cycles (originated though local bifurcations) and sunspots. Incidentally, our results
suggest that capital income taxes and transfers may be desirable, when progressive, to reduce the likelihood
of expectation-driven volatility. We have argued that progressivity is, in the real world, probably lower
than the threshold values predicted by the heterogeneous-agent model, above which local determinacy of
the steady state prevails. However, fiscal schemes may rule out local indeterminacy and bifurcations in the
OLG setting for admissible levels of progressivity. Moreover, our analysis suggests that less-than-maximal
progressivity may still be helpful to reduce the range of parameter values that are compatible with local
sunspots.
Some directions for future research naturally follow. It would be useful to generalize the analysis to the
realistic case whereby progressivity is increasing with income. In the OLG setting, it seems relevant to
introduce consumption/savings choices in the first period of life. In that context, one expects that a smaller
level of progressivity on both incomes could rule out local indeterminacy and bifurcations by stabilizing both
young and old agents’ consumptions. It remains to be seen if this is more in line with actual levels of fiscal
progressivity. It is also expected that progressive taxes and transfers are ineﬃcient to rule out endogenous
fluctuations when consumption is financed, even partially, by the returns from financial assets that would
remain untaxed (e.g. in the monetary economy studied by Benhabib and Laroque [5]). Moreover, although
we have emphasized the stabilizing power of capital taxation in the OLG setting, similar results are expected
in other frameworks, e.g. in models with credit-constrained firms and collateral requirements related to cash-
flows. Finally, it would also be helpful to derive the main features of optimal tax-and-transfer schedules in
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our two benchmark models. We plan to further pursue this line of research in the near future.
A Progressive Labor Income-Based Taxes and Transfers and Workers’
Choices
In this section, we show how workers’ decisions can be reduced to a two-period problem. Workers solve
the following problem:
max
+∞3
t=1
βt−1w V2(c
w
t /B)− βtwV1(lt), (27)
subject to
Mwt−1 + (rt + (1− δ)pt)kwt−1 + ptφ(ωtlt) ≥ ptcwt + ptkwt +Mwt , (28)
Mwt−1 + (rt + (1− δ)pt)kwt−1 ≥ ptcwt + ptkwt , (29)
where B > 0 is a scaling parameter, 0 < βw < 1 is the discount factor, cwt ≥ 0 is consumption, lt ≥ 0 is labor
supply. On the other hand, Mwt−1 ≥ 0 and kwt−1 ≥ 0 are respectively money demand and capital holdings
at the beginning of period t, pt > 0 is the price of consumption goods, wt > 0 is nominal wage, rt > 0 is
nominal return on capital and 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0 is capital depreciation, while ptφ(ωtlt) is disposable wage income
(see Section 2) and ω = w/p defines real wage.
Define λt ≥ 0 and 6t ≥ 0 as the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to (28) and (29) at date t.
Necessary conditions are then the following.
0 ≥ βt−1w V I2(cwt /B)/B − (λt + 6t)pt, = 0 if cwt > 0,
0 ≥ −(λt + 6t)pt + (λt+1 + 6t+1)(rt+1 + (1− δ)pt+1), = 0 if kwt > 0,
0 ≥ −λt + λt+1 + 6t+1, = 0 if Mwt > 0,
0 ≥ −βtwV I1(lt) + λtptωtφI(ωtlt), = 0 if lt > 0.
(30)
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Therefore, capital holdings are zero at all dates (kwt = 0) if the second inequality of (30) is not binding,
that is, if:
V I2(c
w
t /B) > βw(rt+1/pt+1 + 1− δ)V I2(cwt+1/B), (31)
if one assumes that cwt > 0 for all t (we will show that this is the case around the steady state). Condition
(31) implies that workers choose not to hold capital, and it depends on workers’ preferences because of the
financial constraint (29).
Moreover, the financial constraint (29) is binding if 6t > 0, that is, if:
ωtφI(ωtlt)V I2(c
w
t /B)/B > βwV
I
1(lt), (32)
if one assumes that lt > 0 (again, we will show that this is the case around the steady state). Condition (32)
therefore implies that (29) is binding.
Under conditions (31) and (32), workers spend their money holdings , i.e. ptc
w
t = M
w
t−1, and save their
wage income in the form of money, i.e. Mwt = ptφ(ωtlt), so as to consume it tomorrow, i.e. pt+1c
w
t+1 = M
w
t .
Therefore, workers choose lt ≥ 0 and cwt+1 ≥ 0 as solutions to:
max {V2(cwt+1/B)− V1(lt)} s.t. pt+1cwt+1 = ptφ(ωtlt). (33)
The solutions to (33) are unique under Assumption 2.2 and 2.3 and characterized by the following first-order
condition, which is identical to (5) in the main text:
v1(lt) = ψ(ωtlt)v2(cwt+1), pt+1c
w
t+1 = ptφ(ωtlt), (34)
where v2(c) ≡ cV I2(c/B)/B, v1(l) ≡ lV I1(l).
Finally, it is straightforward to show that, under the assumptions that capitalists discount future less
heavily than workers (that is, βw < β) and that βw < 1, conditions (31) and (32) are met at the steady state
under study defined in Proposition B.1. 2
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B Existence of Steady State: Proposition B.1
Proposition B.1 (Existence of a Normalized Steady State)
Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, limc→0 cV I2(c) < V
I
1(1)/ψ(ω(1)) < limc→+∞ cV
I
2(c), (a, k) = (1, 1) is a
steady state of the dynamical system in Eqs. (8) if and only if A = (1/β − 1 + δ)/f I(1) and B is the unique
solution of ψ(ω(1))φ(ω(1))V I2(φ(ω(1))/B)/B = V
I
1(1).
Proof: In view of Eqs. (8) and recalling that a = k/l, the nonautarkic steady states are the solutions (a, l)
in R2++ of v2(φ(ω(a)l)) = v1(l)/ψ(ω(a)l) and βR(a) = 1. Equivalently, in view of Eq. (3), the steady states
are given by: ⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
v2(φ(ω(a)l)) = v1(l)/ψ(ω(a)l),
ρ(a) + 1− δ = 1/β.
(35)
We shall solve the existence issue by setting appropriately the scaling parameters A and B, so as to ensure
that one stationary solution coincides with, for instance, (a, l) = (1, 1). The second equality of Eqs. (35) is
achieved by scaling the parameter A, while the first is achieved by scaling the parameter B. That is, we set
A = (1/β− 1+ δ)/f I(1) to ensure that a = 1. On the other hand, ψ(ω(a)l)v2(c) = v1(l) is then equivalent to
ψ(ω(1))
φ(ω(1))
B
V I2(
φ(ω(1))
B
) = V I1(1). (36)
From Assumption 2.3, v2 is decreasing in B so the latter condition is satisfied for some unique B if and
only if:
lim
c→0
cV I2(c) < V
I
1(1)/ψ(ω(1)) < limc→+∞
cV I2(c). (37)
2
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C Proofs of Propositions C.1 and 2.2
C.1 Proposition C.1: Statement and Proof
We show that the more progressive taxes and transfers (the higher π), the less likely the half-line ∆ is
to cross the indeterminacy triangle ABC, as shown in Figs. C1-C3, and that there exists a minimal level of
fiscal progressivity πmin (illustrated in Fig. 2) above which ∆ does not intersect ABC: the steady state is
either a saddle or a source so that there exists a neighborhood in which no local sunspots occur.
Insert Figures C1-C3 here.
The key implication of increasing progressivity π from zero can be seen, starting with the benchmark case
with linear taxes (see Fig. 1), by focusing on how the two following points vary with π (see Figs. C1-C3).
First, direct inspection of Eqs. (11) shows that Λ (the deviation of (T1,D1) from (AC)) is negative when σ
is small enough (that is, T1 < 1 +D1 when σ < s). In fact, the locus of (T1, D1) generated when σ increases
from zero describes a line ∆1 which intersects (AC) at point I when σ = +∞ (i.e. Λ = 0). From Eqs. (11),
one immediately sees that D1(σ = +∞) increases with π, so that point I goes north-east when π increases
from zero. Second, Eqs. (11) imply that ∆1 intersects the T -axis of equation D = 0 when σ = θ(1− s) (that
is, D1 = 0), and that Λ(σ = θ(1− s)) decreases, from zero, with π. An equivalent way of summarizing these
two observations is that, when π increases from zero, point I (where ∆1 intersects (AC)) goes north-east,
along (AC), whereas the slope of ∆1 decreases from one, so that three diﬀerent configurations occur in the
(T,D) plane (see Figs. C1-C3).
Proposition C.1 (Local Stability and Bifurcations of the Steady State)
Consider a steady state that is assumed to be set at (a, k) = (1, 1) through the procedure in Proposition
B.1. If, moreover, θ(1 − s) < s and π < πmin ≡ 2[θ(1− s)− s +
0
s(s− θ(1− s))]/[θ(1− s)] (that is, fiscal
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progressivity is not too large), the following generically holds.3
1. If 0 < π < 1− θ(1− s)/s, that is, fiscal progressivity is small enough (see Fig. C1):
(a) 0 < σ < σF : the steady state is a sink for 1 < εγ < εγH , where εγH is the value of εγ for which
∆ crosses [BC]. Then the steady state undergoes a Hopf bifurcation (the complex characteristic
roots cross the unit circle) at εγ = εγH , and is a source when εγ > εγH .
(b) σF < σ < σH : the steady state is a sink when 1 < εγ < εγH . Then the steady state undergoes a
Hopf bifurcation at εγ = εγH and is a source when εγH < εγ < εγF . A flip bifurcation occurs (one
characteristic root goes through −1) at εγ = εγF and the steady state is a saddle when εγ > εγF .
(c) σH < σ < σI : the steady state is a sink when 1 < εγ < εγF . A flip bifurcation occurs at εγ = εγF
and the steady state is a saddle if εγ > εγF .
(d) σI < σ < s and s < σ: the steady state is a saddle when εγ > 1.
2. 1− θ(1− s)/s < π < [s− θ(1− s)]/[s− θ(1− s)/2] (see Fig. C2):
(a) 0 < σ < σJ : the steady state is a source when εγ > 1.
(b) σJ < σ < σF : the steady state is a sink for 1 < εγ < εγH . Then the steady state undergoes a Hopf
bifurcation at εγ = εγH , and is a source when εγ > εγH .
(c) σF < σ < σH : the steady state is a sink when 1 < εγ < εγH . Then the steady state undergoes a
Hopf bifurcation at εγ = εγH and is a source when εγH < εγ < εγF . A flip bifurcation occurs at
εγ = εγF and the steady state is a saddle when εγ > εγF .
(d) σH < σ < σI : the steady state is a sink when 1 < εγ < εγF . A flip bifurcation occurs at εγ = εγF
and the steady state is a saddle if εγ > εγF .
(e) σI < σ < s and s < σ: the steady state is a saddle when εγ > 1.
3The expressions of σF , σH , σI , σJ , εγH and εγF are given in the proof of the proposition in Appendix C.
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3. [s− θ(1− s)]/[s− θ(1− s)/2] < π < πmin (see Fig. C3):
(a) 0 < σ < σJ : the steady state is a source when εγ > 1.
(b) σJ < σ < σH : the steady state is a sink when 1 < εγ < εγH . Then the steady state undergoes a
Hopf bifurcation at εγ = εγH and is a source when εγH < εγ < εγF . A flip bifurcation occurs at
εγ = εγF and the steady state is a saddle when εγ > εγF .
(c) σH < σ < σI : the steady state is a sink when 1 < εγ < εγF . A flip bifurcation occurs at εγ = εγF
and the steady state is a saddle if εγ > εγF .
(d) σI < σ < s and s < σ: the steady state is a saddle when εγ > 1.
Proof: To prove formally the occurrence of three configurations, depending on π, our first task is to show
that the point (T1(σ),D1(σ)), as a function of σ, indeed describes part of a line ∆1. From the fact that
T1(σ) = 1+D1(σ)+Λ(σ) and D1(σ) are fractions of first degree polynomials in σ with the same denominator
(see Eq. (11)), we conclude that the ratio of their derivatives DI1(σ)/T
I
1(σ), or D
I
1(σ)/(D
I
1(σ) + Λ
I(σ)), is
independent of σ. Straightforward computations show that the slope of ∆1 is:
slope∆1 =
DI1(σ)
T I1(σ)
=
s− θ(1− s)
s− θ(1− s) + πθ(1− s) . (38)
From Eq. (11), we conclude that Λ(σ) vanishes when σ goes to infinity. It follows that ∆1 intersects the
line (AC) at a point I of coordinates (T1(+∞), D1(+∞)), where D1(+∞) = 1/(1−π) > 0 (see Figs. C1-C3).
We shall focus throughout on the configuration presented in Figs. C1-C3, where D1(+∞) ≥ 1 and the slope
of ∆1 is smaller than 1 (that is, π ≥ 0). We shall ensure the latter condition by imposing, as in the case of
linear (or of no) taxes, that θ(1− s) < s (that is, the share of capital is large enough). This condition is not
very restrictive when θ = 1− β(1− δ) is small, which is bound to be the case when the period is short since
β is then close to one and δ is close to zero. Note that the geometrical method can be applied as well when
these conditions are not met.
Then it follows that both Λ(σ) and D1(σ) are decreasing functions (see Eq. (11)), so that T1(σ) is also a
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decreasing function, i.e. T I1(σ) = D
I
1(σ) + Λ
I(σ) < 0. Accordingly, the slope of ∆1 is smaller than one. From
the above assumptions, one also gets all the necessary information to appraise the variations of (T1(σ),D1(σ))
as well as of the slope of ∆, when σ moves from 0 to +∞. In particular, T1(0) and D1(0) = θ(1−s)/[s(1−π)]
are positive and the corresponding point is above I on the line ∆1 when π > 0 (see Figs. C1-C3). As σ
increases from 0, T1(σ) and D1(σ) are decreasing and tend to −∞ when σ tends to s from below. When
σ = s, the function ω(a)/a of a has a critical point, i.e. its derivative with respect to a vanishes, and the
dynamical system derived from Eqs. (8) is not defined. When σ increases from s to +∞, T1(σ) and D1(σ) are
still both decreasing, from +∞ to (T1(+∞),D1(+∞)), which is represented by the point I in Figs. C1-C3.
On the other hand, the intersection of ∆1 with [BC] is characterized by D1(σ) = 1 which leads, in view of
Eq. (11), to σJ = [θ(1−s)−s(1−π)]/π. In addition, the slope of ∆ as a function of σ increases monotonically
from −∞ to 1 as σ moves from 0 to +∞, and vanishes when D1(σ) = 0. Moreover, the half-line ∆ is above
∆1 when σ < s, and below it when σ > s.
Therefore, three configurations arise when π increases from zero. When π < 1 − θ(1 − s)/s (case 1) then
D1(0) < 1: the geometric picture is as in Fig. 2 and it is not qualitatively diﬀerent from the case of linear
(or no) taxes (compare Figs. 1 and 2). Second, D1(0) > 1 when π < 1 − θ(1 − s)/s, and two cases arise
depending on whether π is smaller or larger than [s− θ(1− s)]/[s− θ(1− s)/2]. More precisely, the slope of
∆ at σ = σJ (that is, when D1(σJ) = 1) is smaller than −1) when π < [s − θ(1 − s)]/[s− θ(1− s)/2] (case
2). In that case, the steady state is a source when σ is close enough to zero (0 < σ < σJ) and it undergoes
the same sequences of bifurcations as in case 1 when σ > σJ . Finally, case 3 occurs when the slope of ∆ at
σ = σJ is larger than −1, that is, when π > [s− θ(1− s)]/[s− θ(1− s)/2] and π < πmin. 2
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C.2 Proposition C.1: Local Bifurcation Values
In this subsection, we derive all bifurcation values as functions of the structural parameters. We define
θ def= 1− β(1− δ), and s∆(σ) def= 1− θ(1− s)/σ as the slope of the half-line ∆.
An eigenvalue of −1: the flip bifurcation.
The equality s∆(σ) = −1 allows one to derive σF = θ(1− s)/2, so that s∆(σ) < −1 when σ < σF .
Equation 1 + T (εγ) +D(εγ) = 0 yields εγF = (1− π)(2s+ θ(1− s)− 2σ)/[2σ − θ(1− s)].
The condition that 1 + T1(σ) + D1(σ) = 0 or, equivalently εγF = 1, gives the last flip bifurcation value
σI = [θ(1− s)(2− π) + 2s(1− π)]/[2(2− π)] so that εγF > 1 when σ < σI .
A pair of eigenvalues of modulus 1: the Hopf bifurcation.
The condition that T (εγH) = −2 when D = 1, i.e. when εγ = εγH = 1/D1, is rewritten as QH(σ) def=
aσ2 + bσ + c, the roots of which contain the bifurcation value σH . The coeﬃcients of QH(σ) are:
a = 4,
b = −4[s+ θ(1− s)],
c = θ(1− s)[θ(1− s) + 3s].
It is easily shown that there must exist two distinct real roots, and that σH = s[1+θ(1−s)/s−
0
1− θ(1− s)/s]/2
is the lowest.
The condition D1(σ) = 1 yields, in view of Eqs. (11), σJ = [θ(1− s)− s(1− π)]/π. Morever, the bifurcation
value εγH = (1− π)(s− σ)/[θ(1− s)− σ)] follows from D = εγD1 = 1, i.e. εγH = 1/D1. 2
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C.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proving Proposition 2.2 relies on the geometrical configuration and local bifurcation values of Proposition
C.1, as exposed in Subsections C.1 and C.2. In particular, there exists a critical value πmin such that ∆1
goes through point B (see Fig. 2). The expression πmin is the value of π that solves σI = σJ , that is,
π ≡ 2[θ(1 − s)− s +
0
s(s− θ(1− s))]/[θ(1 − s)]. This implies that ∆ does not intersect the ABC triangle
when π > πmin. Therefore, the steady state is either a saddle or a source for all εγ > 1. 2
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Figure 1 
The heterogeneous agents model with linear taxes and transfers 
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The OLG model with linear taxes and transfers 
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Progressive taxes and transfers on capital income 
in the heterogeneous agents model 
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Threshold level of progressive taxes and transfers on capital income πmin  
in the OLG model 
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Progressive taxes and transfers on labor income  
in the heterogeneous agents model – Case 1 
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Progressive taxes and transfers on labor income  
in the heterogeneous agents model – Case 3 
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Progressive taxes and transfers on labor income  
in the heterogeneous agents model – Case 2 
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